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Abstract 
The paper examines the decision by Australian Real Estate Trusts (A-REITs) to issue 
seasoned equity offerings from 2000 - 2008 and stock market reaction to the offerings 
using panel data and event study methodologies, respectively. The global financial crisis 
has resulted in freezing of the Australian bond markets, with several A-REITs left with 
seasoned equity issuance and asset sales as the only viable modes of raising additional 
capital. The findings review that leverage and operating risk are negative significant 
determinants of seasoned equity offerings; profitability and growth opportunities are 
positive significant determinants. Of the structure and type of properties held by the A-
REIT, only stapled management structure and international operations are significant 
determinants. Type of properties held by A-REITs show inconsistent results. Similar to 
previous studies of seasoned equity offerings, we find a significant negative abnormal 
return associated with their announcement and no evidence of excessive leakage of 
information. Cross-sectional regressions show that the issued amount raised and leverage 
are significant factors affecting abnormal returns. 
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Introduction 
Many A-REITs used equity capital to fuel growth and expansion during the mid-1990’s, 
but later switched to debt financing in 1997 when the Reserve Bank of Australia cut 
interest rates in the second half of 1996, which made debt financing a cheaper option to 
equity capital (Kavanagh 1997). Chikolwa (2009) shows the dominance by A-REITs of 
using public debt to funding operations and expansion through commercial mortgage-
backed securities and unsecured bonds over equity raisings for the period 2000 - 2008. 
With the shutting down of the Australian public debt markets in Q3:2007, A-REIT equity 
raisings came back in vogue with a total of AU$14.4 billion raised in 2007 - 2008. PIR 
(2008) state that a total AU$50.9 billion was raised through equity raisings between 2000 
– 2008. The current issuances counter established theory that firms time their equity 
issue to coincide with high equity prices (Baker et al. 2003), SEO firms exhibit strong 
abnormal performance during the period preceding issue (Schultz 2003, 2004) and that 
shareholders and management will attempt to take advantage of ‘window of opportunity’ 
in choosing when to issue equity (Loughran & Ritter 1995; Ritter 1991)
1
. 
 
Newell (2008) showed the prominence of the A-REIT market second to the US and two 
A-REITs (Westfield and Stockland) being part of the top 10 largest REITs as at 
December 2007 and yet no study has empirically investigated A-REIT equity raisings. 
Prior non-Australian REIT research documents that investors react negatively, on 
average, to announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEO) (Brounen & Eichholtz 
2002; Ghosh et al. 1999; Marciukaityte et al. 2007), although competing explanations 
                                                 
1
 Quarterly total returns of the S&P/ASX A-REIT 300 and the ASX All Ordinaries indices fell by -33.2% and 
by 20.2%, respectively, to December 2008. With the Australia public debt market closed, asset sales and SEOs 
were the main capital raising options available for A-REITs. 
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remain for these empirical results and little evidence exits of the determinants of REIT’s 
choice to issue SEOs. 
 
As such, the purpose of this paper is to analyse two areas of A-REIT SEOs, namely, 
determinants of the decision by an A-REIT to issue SEO and market reaction to SEOs. 
Apart from data being based on Australia, the study differs from previous international 
studies as it includes other firm-specific attributes such as property sector, stapled 
management structure
2
 and international operations in addition to the traditional 
determinants of capital structure such as asset size, profitability ratios, tangibility of 
assets, growth opportunities, and operating risk. The analysis is conducted using data 
pertaining to 34 A-REITs in the S&P/ASX 300 for the period 2000 - 2008.  
 
Our results show that that leverage, growth opportunities and operating risk are the main 
determinants of the decision by A-REITs to issue SEO. Of the property-specific factors, 
only stapled management structure and international operations are significant 
determinants, with property sector showing inconsistent results. Similar to previous 
REIT studies of SEO, we find a significant negative abnormal return associated with 
their announcement and no evidence of excessive leakage of information. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on SEO. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology. The study results and their analyses are shown in 
Section 4. Concluding remarks and future research directions are shown in Section 5.  
                                                 
2
 Stapled management structure involves funds management and property  development, in addition to the 
traditional passive property holding for investment. 
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Literature Review 
Several competing explanations have been postulated on why investors react negatively, on 
average, to SEO announcements. 
 
The essential argument of the price pressure hypothesis is that the negative market reaction to 
equity issues occurs because there are no very close substitutes for the equity of the issuing 
company, and so the price has to fall sharply for the market to absorb the increased quantity 
supplied (Scholes 1972). However, Loderer et. al (1991) found no evidence to suggest that the 
negative abnormal returns were due to the determinants of price elasticity. 
 
Under the information asymmetry effect hypothesis, negative stock price reactions to the 
announcements and attributes this phenomenon to the information asymmetry between corporate 
managers and outside investors (Myers & Majluf 1984).  Corporate managers have superior 
information about investment projects, with outside investors believing that managers act in the 
interest of existing shareholders and therefore prefer to issue equity when they perceive that it is 
overvalued. Korajczyk et al. (1991) argue that the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders is not fixed over time and firms will prefer to issue equity when the market is most 
informed. 
 
Miller and Rock’s (1985) investment opportunity hypothesis theorises that firms are faced with 
constant investment requirements and thus security issues signal a projected shortfall in the 
earnings of the issuing company. Chang and Chen (2007) find that announcing firms with 
favourable investment opportunities have a positive response to the announcements of their 
secured debt offerings, in contrast to Eckbo (1986) who found that share prices did not change 
significantly when debt issues were announced to the market.  
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Barclay and Litzenberger’s (1988) wasteful investment hypothesis postulates that market reaction 
to all disclosures of new security issues will be positively related to indications of corporate 
growth prospects. This builds on earlier insights by Jensen's (1986) analysis that the market 
reaction to new financing announcements will reflect investors' awareness that managers have an 
incentive to overinvest newly raised funds by spending the cash on projects with negative net 
present values (NPVs) as long as their rewards are closely linked to the size of the firm rather 
than to shareholders' wealth. The theory therefore predicts that the market reaction to equity 
issues will be adverse as long as investors are sceptical of managers' motives. 
 
Under the wealth effects hypothesis, unexpected issue of new equity reduces the risk of 
the firms’ outstanding debt and consequently results in a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to bondholders. Therefore, the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio decrease results in 
negative abnormal returns (Masulis 1983). However, Elliot et al (2009) find that 
bondholders experience a significant positive return on the announcement of an SEO and 
this effect is more pronounced for bonds with lower ratings. 
 
Previous attempts to identify the factors which explain any cross-sectional variation in 
the market reaction to seasoned equity offers (SEOs) have provided relatively mixed 
results. For example, several studies have examined the relationship between the size of 
an equity issue and the market reaction to the announcement; they find that the 
association is either (i) negative and insignificant (Aggarwal & Zhao 2008; Lin et al. 
2008), (ii) negative and significant (Ghosh et al. 1999; Masulis & Korwar 1986), or (iii) 
positive and insignificant (Sant & Ferris 1994), Other variables which have been 
examined as potential determinants of the market reaction to SEOs include (a) pre-issue 
information (Lin et al. 2008), (b) debt levels (Walker & Yost 2008), (c) issue purposes 
(Autore et al. 2009), (d) growth opportunities (Burton et al. 2000; Chou et al. 2009), (e) 
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institutional holding (Ghosh et al. 1999), (f) operating performance of issuer 
(Andrikopoulos 2009); investigations into the role played by each of these factors also 
show mixed results. 
 
Lin et al (2008) find none of the pre-issue disclosures by managers to reduce the costs of 
SEOs are capable of reducing the price drop at issue announcement and that both price 
and trading volume reactions are not related to the intervals between the disclosures and 
the issue announcements. 
 
Autore et al. (2009) find that issuers stating recapitalization or general corporate 
purposes experience abnormally poor performance in the subsequent three years, but 
issuers stating investment display little or no subsequent underperformance. 
Recapitalisation includes issuing equity to pay down debt obligations. If debt is 
excessive, recapitalizing by issuing equity to pay down debt might reduce shareholder 
value. To avoid this, management could recapitalize debt by issuing stock when investors 
are overly optimistic about the firm's future prospects, potentially resulting in relative 
devaluation over the long-run. For example, Hertzel and Li (2007) find that issuing firms 
that are overvalued tend to reduce debt after the issue. A different insight is offered by 
Walker and Yost (2008), who find that firms with a stated intention of paying down debt 
actually have leverage ratios three years after the SEO that are similar to leverage ratios 
prior to the SEO. Thus, firms issuing equity to refinance may be opportunistic market 
timers and, therefore, we expect these firms to experience poor long-run performance. 
 
Autore et al. (2009) and Hertzel and Li (2007), find that issuers with higher growth 
options invest more after the SEO and do not experience poor post-issue stock returns, 
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but issuers with greater overvaluation decrease long-term debt and increase cash after the 
issue and suffer poor long-run stock performance. This finding differs, however, from 
the result of Walker and Yost (2008) that issuers intending to decrease debt have 
subsequent improvements in industry-adjusted operating performance. Another contrary 
view of the negative relation between the level of growth opportunities and post-offering 
long-term stock performance for firms issuing equity privately is offered by Chou et al. 
(2009) who attribute this to three explanations: real investment hypothesis (Li et al. 
2009), skewness preference (Barberis & Huang 2008), and conditional over-optimism.  
 
Ghosh et al. (1999) found the structure and type of properties held by the REIT to be 
insignificant, with no allowable inference to be drawn. 
 
Andrikopoulos (2009) state that the long-term underperformance is significantly related 
to a deterioration of companies’ operating fundamentals in the post-offering period. 
Allen and Soucik (2008) report underperformance of Australian firms issuing seasoned 
equity during the first 5 years following the offer and significant overinvestment in the 
sixth year. They attribute the underperformance to the initial underpricing, as reflected in 
the dilution yield measure of initial returns. 
Data and Methodology 
Data and Sample Selection 
This study examines the event of SEOs of the 34 A-REITs in the S&P/ASX 300 index 
during 2000 – 2008. The financial data and trading data for A-REITs were collected 
from Aspect Fin Analysis and Connect 4 databases, respectively. There were 93 SEOs 
above AU$10 million totalling of AU$ 25.4 billion during this period.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics regarding the sample are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 shows that most of the variables in the dataset are not highly correlated. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Correlation Coefficients 
Variable  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. No. of 
Observations
ERD 7.913 9.277 4.768 0.721 93
LTA 0.417 1.003 0.000 0.185 229
ROA 0.026 0.220 -7.652 0.511 229
TOQ 1.001 2.028 0.000 0.353 229
PPT 0.556 0.999 0.000 0.372 229
SDE 0.124 2.590 0.000 0.471 229
SIZ 8.933 10.706 0.000 1.590 229
SRE 0.197 1.000 0.000 0.398 229
SOF 0.135 1.000 0.000 0.343 229
SDD 0.074 1.000 0.000 0.263 229
SOT 0.279 1.000 0.000 0.450 229
SSS 0.541 1.000 0.000 0.499 229
INT 0.616 1.000 0.000 0.487 229
Notes: The summary statistics are based on the final sample of 229 firm-year observations. Natural log of AU$ million 
of seasoned equity raised (ERD). The regressors are leverage: the ratio of total liability to total assets (LTA); 
profitability: return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); tangibility: ratio of book value of property 
to total assets (PPT); operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total assets for each firm over the entire 
period covered (SDE); size: natural logarithm of total assets (SIZ); and property sector dummy variables of 1 or 0 
otherwise: retail (SRE), office (SOF), industrial (SDD); others (SOT); stapled structure management dummy varaible of 1 
or 0 otherwise (SSS); and international operations dummy variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT). 
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Measurement and Interpretation of Variables 
 
Following previous studies that have used leverage (Walker & Yost 2008), profitability 
(Andrikopoulos 2009), tangibility (Lyandres et al. 2008), size (Guo & Mech 2000), 
growth opportunities (Chou et al. 2009) and operating risk (Guo & Mech 2000) as 
determinants of SEOs, additional variables of property sector, stapled management 
structure, and international operations are included in this study to fully capture the 
structure and type of properties held by the A-REIT similar to Ghosh et al. (1999). 
 
Guo and Mech (2000) document evidence that larger firm, the higher the probability of 
SEOs. They also suggest that security risk is a more direct measure of valuation of 
uncertainty, which implies that firms with higher risk are less likely to issue equity. In 
addition, they show that firms with more cash on hand and expected internal cash flow 
LTA ROA TOQ PPT SDE SIZ SRE SOF SDD SOT SSS
ROA -0.113
TOQ 0.244 -0.101
PPT -0.328 0.104 -0.124
SDE 0.112 -0.355 0.355 -0.194
SIZ 0.311 0.141 0.351 0.297 -0.118
SRE -0.050 0.032 -0.204 0.164 -0.096 0.017
SOF -0.164 0.027 -0.013 0.297 -0.086 0.085 -0.196
SDD -0.071 0.018 -0.084 0.147 -0.060 0.084 -0.140 -0.112
SOT 0.337 0.046 0.128 -0.410 -0.111 -0.139 -0.308 -0.246 -0.176
SSS 0.084 -0.059 0.148 -0.305 0.175 0.020 -0.185 -0.225 -0.141 -0.052
INT -0.010 0.081 -0.179 0.034 -0.229 0.126 0.187 0.076 0.224 -0.348 0.084
Notes: The summary statistics are based on the final sample of 229 firm-year observations. The dependent 
variables for the models are binary taking the value of 1 if an A-REIT raised seasoned equity, 0 othersiwise.  The 
regressors are leverage: the ratio of total liability to total assets (LTA); profitability: return on assets (ROA); 
growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); tangibility: ratio of book value of property to total assets (PPT); 
operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total assets for each firm over the entire period covered 
(SDE); size: natural logarithm of total assets (SIZ); and property sector dummy variables of 1 or 0 otherwise: 
retail (SRE), office (SOF), industrial (SDD); others (SOT); stapled structure management dummy varaible of 1 or 
0 otherwise (SSS); and international operations dummy variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT). 
11 
 
are less likely to issue equity. Burton et al. (2000) and Chou et al. (2009) report the effect 
of equity issue announcements is influenced by the value of the growth opportunities of 
the issuing firm. Lyandres at al. (2008) employ the ratio of investment in real assets to 
total assets as a measure of investment. We proxy size by the natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZ) and use return on assets (ROA) to measure profitability. We use an 
approximation of Tobin’s q (TOQ) to proxy for growth opportunities. The Tobin’s q 
ratio is defined as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to 
the book value of assets. The proxy for tangibility is the ratio of the book value of 
property to total assets (PPT). Standard deviation of earnings before income tax (EBIT) 
scaled by total assets (SDE) for each firm over the entire period covered is used as a 
proxy for operating risk. 
Probit Model  
Accordingly, the probit model we employ to estimate the probability of a SEO is as 
follows: 
 
Prob (SEOit = 1) = α0 + αLTAi +  αROAi +  αTOQi +  αPPTi + αSDEi + αSIZi + 
αDUMp,i + αDUMs,i  + αDUMI,i + ζi   (1) 
 
where: SEO =  dummy variable that equals 1 if an A-REIT i issued a SEO in year  
t, and 0; 
LTA = ratio of total liability to total assets; 
ROA = return on assets; 
TOQ = ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the 
book value of assets; 
PPT = ratio of the book value of property to total assets; 
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SDE = standard deviation of earnings before income tax (EBIT) scaled by 
total assets; 
SIZ = natural logarithm of total assets; 
DUMP = dummy variable for property sector; 
DUMS = dummy variable for stapled management structure; and 
DUMI = dummy variable for international operations. 
Event Study Methodology 
 
To analyse the price effect of the SEOs, the standard market model approach was 
employed as outline in Brown & Warner (1985). Specifically, each sample observation 
was regressed against a market index using an ordinary least square as follows: 
 
Rit = αi+βiRmt +εit        (2) 
 
where: Rit  = continuous return on the shares of firm i during period t; 
 Rmt = continuous return on the market index during period t;  
 αi  = intercept for firm i; and 
 βi  = slope coefficient (market beta) for firm i. 
 
An estimation window of (-115, -16) was used for the above regression. The window 
was deemed appropriate considering that prior studies tended to use a similar size 
estimation window, and that 100 trading days strike a balance between accurately 
gauging a company’s relationship to the market and incorporating too many firm specific 
trends that could bias the regression.  
 
13 
 
The alpha and beta of the market model were used to calculate the predicted returns of 
each observation over a range of event window, [-15,+15]. The Abnormal Return (AR) 
for each event day was then calculated as the difference between the observed return and 
predicted return.  
 
Next, the standardized abnormal return (Seiler 2004) was aggregated across the sample, 
giving the total standardized abnormal return (TSAR) for each event day.  
 
 =  and  =  (3) 
 
where: SARjt  = standardized abnormal return for firm j in day t of the event  
  window;  
ARjt  = abnormal return for firm j in day t of the event window; 
 = variance for firm j in day t of the event window; 
TSARjt  = total standardized abnormal return for the sample on day t  
  of the event window; and  
j = 1 & N are the first and last firm, respectively in the sample.  
 
Additionally, to analyse the price effect over the event period, the total cumulative 
standardized abnormal return (TSCAR) was calculated:  
  
 =     (4) 
 
where: TSCARN  = total standardized cumulative abnormal return over period  
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    N; 
 t1 and t2    = first and last event days, respectively, of period N. 
 
All hypotheses were accepted or rejected according to the Z statistic, calculated as:  
 
Z(TSAR) =  
 or 
 Z(TSCAR) =  (5) 
 
where: TSCARN = total standardized cumulative abnormal return over period N;  
 Dj = number of observed trading day returns for firm j over the ε 
  estimation period; 
 T1 = earliest date in the event window; 
 T2 = later date in the even window; and  
 N = number of firm in the sample. 
Ordinary Least Square Methodology 
The model developed here aims at identifying factors of SEO announcement returns and was 
tested using an ordinary least square regression frame. The following multivariate regression 
equation was used: 
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 CARit = α0 + β1ERDi + β2LTAi + β3ROAi + β4TOQi + β5PPTi + β6SDEi + 
β7SIZi + β8DUMp,i + β9DUMs,i + β10DUMI,i +εit  (6) 
  
where: CARit = standardized cumulative abnormal return day -1 to day t;  
ERD  = natural logarithm of issued amount; 
Results and Analysis 
Determinants of SEO Issuance Choice 
 
Two separate, single equation models were estimated by probit model. The results are 
given in Table 3. The models explain between 17% and 25 % of the within-sample 
variance in the dependent variables and the LR statistics show that the models are, 
overall, significant. 
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Table 3:  Probit Regression Results of SEO Issuance Choice 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to maintain brevity and to capture the A-REIT setting, only results of model 2 
are discussed. Leverage (LTA) and operating risk (SDE) show a negative significant 
relationship at 10% level and 5% level, respectively, to the decision to issue SEOs by A-
REITs. This result supports that of Guo and Mech (2000) that highly leveraged firms 
with variable earnings are less likely to issue SEOs. Profitability (ROA) and growth 
opportunities (TOQ) are positive and significant at 5% level. The result for profitability 
is anomalous as profitable firms are less likely to issue SEOs. Tangibility and size are 
insignificant. Variables for structure and type of properties held by the A-REIT are 
Variable
Coeff. z-Statistic Prob.  Coeff. z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.350 -0.700 0.484 -0.367 -0.623 0.533
LTA -1.185 -1.719 0.086 -1.054 -1.620 0.105
ROA 4.107 1.334 0.182 5.863 1.822 0.069
TOQ 0.441 1.416 0.157 0.722 2.165 0.030
PPT 0.790 2.521 0.012 0.297 0.829 0.407
SDE -9.491 -2.667 0.008 -14.464 -3.412 0.001
SIZ -0.037 -0.494 0.621 -0.051 -0.649 0.516
SRE 1.929 0.054
SOF 1.166 0.243
SDD -0.097 0.922
SOT -0.917 0.359
SSS -2.551 0.011
INT 1.978 0.048
McFadden R-squared 0.165 0.253
LR statistic 50.024 76.638
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000 0.000
Model 2Model 1
Notes: The dependent variables for the models are binary taking the value of 1 if an A-REIT raised seasoned 
equity, 0 othersiwise. The regressors are leverage: the ratio of total liability to total assets (LTA); 
profitability: return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); tangibility: ratio of book value 
of property to total assets (PPT); operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total assets for each 
firm over the entire period covered (SDE); size: natural logarithm of total assets (SIZ); and property sector 
dummy variables of 1 or 0 otherwise: retail (SRE), office (SOF), industrial (SDD); others (SOT); stapled 
structure management dummy varaible of 1 or 0 otherwise (SSS); and international operations dummy 
variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT). 
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inconsistent and mainly insignificant; only the retail A-REIT, stapled management 
structure and international operations variables are significant at 5% level. 
Event Study Results 
 
TCAR and TSCAR for the entire sample during the event window are shown in Table 4. 
The TCAR at the event day experienced a significant negative daily return of -36.1%, 
with z statistics of -4.50 and achieving significant p value at 1% level. A further fall is 
observed on +1 day at -61.1%, which shows that the market fully reflects the effects of 
the announcement after a day. Other post-event days are statistically insignificant apart 
from day +6 which is statistically significant at 5%. No evidence of major pre-
announcement leakage is observed as only days -12 and -4 are significant at 5% level. 
 
The TSCAR is statistically significant at 1% level from event day until the end of the 
event period. 
 
Our results though similar in effect to Ghosh et al. (1999), are different in magnitude 
which may be explainable by differences in analysis time periods and location settings. 
Results of Ghosh et. al are -0.416% on the event day and -0.630% on day +1. 
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Table 4: Stock Price Effects Surrounding the Announcement of A-REIT Seasoned 
Equity Issues 
 
 
Event Day TSAR Z-Statistic p-Value TSCAR Z-Statistic p-Value
-15 -8.60361 -1.07284 0.28335 -8.60361 -1.06442 0.28714
-14 -2.27210 -0.28332 0.77693 -10.87571 -0.95143 0.34139
-13 4.99696 0.62310 0.53322 -5.87875 -0.41991 0.67455
-12 -18.03156 -2.24846 0.02455 -23.91031 -1.47907 0.13912
-11 -0.03135 -0.00391 0.99688 -23.94166 -1.32465 0.18529
-10 4.21209 0.52523 0.59942 -19.72957 -0.99649 0.31901
-9 -10.09501 -1.25881 0.20810 -29.82459 -1.39463 0.16313
-8 -4.00048 -0.49884 0.61789 -33.82507 -1.47954 0.13900
-7 -8.56443 -1.06795 0.28554 -42.38950 -1.74811 0.08044
-6 -3.20962 -0.40023 0.68899 -45.59912 -1.78398 0.07443
-5 -11.52366 -1.43695 0.15073 -57.12279 -2.13081 0.03310
-4 15.44473 1.92589 0.05412 -41.67806 -1.48850 0.13662
-3 -10.80590 -1.34745 0.17783 -52.48396 -1.80089 0.07172
-2 5.16495 0.64405 0.51954 -47.31901 -1.56460 0.11768
-1 7.97924 0.99498 0.31975 -39.33976 -1.25666 0.20888
0 -36.10126 -4.50168 0.00001 -75.44102 -2.33335 0.01963
1 -61.10880 -7.62002 0.00000 -136.54981 -4.09731 0.00004
2 -12.98997 -1.61980 0.10528 -149.53979 -4.36067 0.00001
3 -17.14586 -2.13802 0.03252 -166.68565 -4.73101 0.00000
4 -2.30470 -0.28739 0.77382 -168.99035 -4.67498 0.00000
5 -1.31633 -0.16414 0.86962 -170.30668 -4.59785 0.00000
6 19.66979 2.45274 0.01418 -150.63689 -3.97331 0.00007
7 -0.21429 -0.02672 0.97868 -150.85117 -3.89150 0.00010
8 -9.71117 -1.21094 0.22592 -160.56235 -4.05481 0.00005
9 -1.95361 -0.24361 0.80753 -162.51596 -4.02123 0.00006
10 -5.10829 -0.63698 0.52414 -167.62425 -4.06708 0.00005
11 0.40763 0.05083 0.95946 -167.21662 -3.98135 0.00007
12 -11.78729 -1.46983 0.14161 -179.00391 -4.18520 0.00003
13 1.28872 0.16070 0.87233 -177.71520 -4.08280 0.00004
14 -5.55416 -0.69258 0.48857 -183.26936 -4.13963 0.00003
15 -5.88000 -0.73321 0.46343 -189.14936 -4.20297 0.00003
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding seasoned equity 
announcements of over AU$10 million by A-REITs in the S&P ASX300 index over 
the sample period of 2000 to 2008. The event day (Day 0) is defined as the actual 
date of announcement by the A-REIT. TSAR is the total abnormal return of the 
cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. TSCAR is the 
total cumulative average abnormal return between day -15 and the relevant event 
day.
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Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
 
In Table 5, we investigate the cross-section of the market reaction to the announcement 
of the firm's intention to issue SEOs. The dependent variable in each of the models is the 
two-day CAR, as described earlier. The first and second models focus on the impact of 
the issued amount on abnormal returns. The base model (model 1) includes control 
variables for the firm's leverage, profitability, growth opportunities, tangibility, operating 
risk and size. Model 2 includes property sector, stapled management structure and 
international operations valuables, in addition to the base model variables. 
 
Table 5: Regression Analysis of CAR 
 
Variable
Coeff. t-Statistic Prob.  Coeff. t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.020 -0.579 0.565 -0.065 -1.146 0.259
ERD 0.006 5.249 0.000 0.007 4.527 0.000
LTA 0.022 2.029 0.048 0.024 1.789 0.081
ROA -0.070 -1.581 0.121 -0.124 -1.793 0.081
TOQ -0.011 -1.644 0.107 -0.005 -0.346 0.731
PPT -0.003 -0.699 0.488 -0.002 -0.315 0.754
SDE 0.025 0.747 0.459 0.046 0.914 0.366
SIZ -0.002 -0.960 0.342 0.001 0.247 0.806
SRE 0.002 0.446 0.658
SOF 0.000 -0.048 0.962
SDD 0.004 0.411 0.683
SOT 0.007 1.363 0.181
SSS 0.004 1.085 0.284
INT 0.002 0.406 0.687
R-squared 0.370 0.381
Model 1 Model 2
Notes: The dependent variable is the average cumulative abnormal return for day 0 and +1. The 
regressors are natural log of the issued ammount (ERD); leverage: the ratio of total liability to total 
assets (LTA); profitability: return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); 
tangibility: ratio of book value of property to total assets (PPT); operating risk: standard deviation of 
EBIT scaled by total assets for each firm over the entire period covered (SDE); size: natural logarithm 
of total assets (SIZ); and property sector dummy variables of 1 or 0 otherwise: retail (SRE), office 
(SOF), industrial (SDD); others (SOT); stapled structure management dummy varaible of 1 or 0 
otherwise (SSS); and international operations dummy variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT). 
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In both models, the issued amount (ERD) and leverage (LTA) are positive and 
significant. Profitability (ROA), growth prospects (TOQ), and tangibility (PPT) are 
negative and insignificant. Operating risk (SDE) and size (SIZ) have anticipated signs 
but are also insignificant. Similar to Ghosh et al. (1999) we find structure and type of 
properties held by the A-REIT to be insignificant. 
 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
The paper examines the decision by Australian Real Estate Trusts (A-REITs) to issue 
seasoned equity offerings from 2000 - 2008 and stock market reaction to the offerings. 
The findings review that leverage and operating risk are negative significant 
determinants of seasoned equity offerings; profitability and growth opportunities are 
positive significant determinants. Of the structure and type of properties held by the A-
REIT, only stapled management structure and international operations are significant 
determinants. Type of properties held by A-REITs show inconsistent results. Similar to 
previous studies of seasoned equity offerings, we find a significant negative abnormal 
return associated with their announcement and no evidence of excessive leakage of 
information. Cross-sectional regressions show that the issued amount raised and leverage 
are significant factors affecting abnormal returns. 
 
These findings add to literature because no study has examined SEOs by A-REITs, with 
Australia being the second largest global REIT market. 
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Further research could be carried out to examine A-REIT SEOs under different economic 
conditions. This could involve the period before the advent of the global financial crisis 
from 2000 – 2006 and when its effects are being fully felt after 2007. 
 
Acknowledgement  
The author gratefully acknowledges and thanks IPD Australia and the Property Council 
of Australia for provision of data on returns indices. 
22 
 
References 
 
Aggarwal, R. and Zhao, X. 2008, 'Significant Issuance Date Returns in Seasoned Equity 
Offerings: An Option-Based Resolution of a Puzzle', International Review of Financial 
Analysis, vol. 17, pp. 793-804.  
 
Allen, D. E. and Soucik, V. 2008, 'Long-Run Underperformance of Seasoned Equity 
Offerings: Fact or Illusion', Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, vol. 78, pp. 146-
154.  
 
Andrikopoulos, P. 2009, 'Seasoned Equity Offerings,Operating Performance and 
Overconfidence: Evidence from the UK', Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 61, 
no. 3, pp. 189-215.  
 
Autore, D. M., Bray, D. E. and Peterson, D. R. 2009, 'Intended Use of Proceeds and the 
Long-Run Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers', Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 
Article in Press, no. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.12.003.  
 
Baker, M., Stein, J. C. and Wurgler, J. 2003, 'When Does the Market Matter? Stock 
Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms', Quarterly Review of Economics, 
vol. 111, pp. 969-1005.  
 
Barberis, N. and Huang, M. 2008, 'Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability 
Weighting for Security Prices', American Economic Review, vol. 98, pp. 2066-2100.  
 
Barclay, M. J. and Litzenberger, R. H. 1988, 'Announcement Effects of New Equity 
Issues and the Use of Intraday Price Data', Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 21, pp. 
71-99.  
 
Brounen, D. and Eichholtz, P. M. A. 2002, 'Capital Structure Theory: Evidence from 
European Property Companies' Capital Offerings', Real Estate Economics, vol. 29, no. 4, 
pp. 615-632.  
23 
 
 
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B. 1985, 'Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event 
Studies', Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 14, pp. 3-31.  
 
Burton, B. M., Lonie, A. A. and Power, P. M. 2000, 'The Impacts of Corporate Growth 
Opportunities on the Market Response to New Equity Announcements', Applied 
Financial Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 27-36.  
 
Chang, S.-C., Chen, S.-S., Hsing, A. and Huang, C. W. 2007, 'Investment Opportunities, 
Free Cash Flow, and Stock Valuation Effects of Secured Debt Offerings', Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, vol. 28, pp. 123-145.  
 
Chikolwa, B. 2009, 'Determinants of Capital Structure for A-REITs', in 15th Annual 
Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, 18-21 January, Sydney. 
 
Chou, D.-W., Gombola, M. and Liu, F.-Y. 2009, 'Long-Run Underperformance 
Following Private Equity Placements: The Role of Growth Opportunities', Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance, vol. doi:10.1016/j.qref.2008.11.003.  
 
Eckbo, B. E. 1986, 'Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings', Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 15, pp. 119-151.  
 
Elliott, W. B., Prevost, A. K. and Rao, R. P. 2009, 'The Announcement Impact of 
Seasoned Equity Offerings on Bondholder Wealth', Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 
33, no. 8, pp. 1472-1480.  
 
Ghosh, C., Nag, R. and Sirmans, C. F. 1999, 'An Analysis of Seasoned Equity Offerings 
By Equity REITs (1991-1995)', Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, vol. 19, 
no. 3, pp. 175-195.  
 
Guo, L. and Mech, T. S. 2000, 'Conditional Event Studies, Anticipation, and Asymmetric 
Information: The Case of Seasoned Equity Issues and Pre-Information Releases', Journal 
of Empirical Finance, vol. 7, pp. 113-141.  
 
24 
 
Hertzel, M. G. and Li, Z. 2007, 'Behavioral and Rational Explanations of Stock Price 
Performance Around SEOs: Evidence From a Decomposition of Market-to-Book Ratios', 
in Working paper. Arizona State University. 
 
Jensen, M. C. 1986, 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers', American Economic Review, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 323-329.  
 
Kavanagh, J. 1997, 'Trust Changing Gear', Property Australia, no. June, pp. 14-15.  
 
Korajczyk, R. A., Lucas, D. J. and McDonald, R. L. 1991, 'The Effect of Information 
Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity Issues', Review of Financial Studies, vol. 
4, no. 4, pp. 685-708.  
 
Li, E., Livdan, D. and Zhang, L. 2009, 'Anomalies', Review of Financial Economics, vol. 
In Press.  
 
Lin, Y.-M., You, S.-J. and Lin, F.-J. 2008, 'The Effects of Pre-issue Information Releases 
on Seasoned Equity Offerings', Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 35, no. 9 
& 10, pp. 1138-1163.  
 
Loderer, C. F., Sheehan, D. P. and Kadlec, G. B. 1991, 'The Pricing of Equity Offerings', 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 29, pp. 35-57.  
 
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J. 1995, 'The New Issues Puzzle', Journal of Finance, vol. 50, 
no. 23-51.  
 
Lyandres, E., Sun, L. and Zhang, L. 2008, 'The New Issues Puzzle: Testing the 
Investment-Based Explanation', Review of Financial Studies, vol. 21, pp. 2825-2855.  
 
Marciukaityte, D., Higgins, E. J., Friday, H. S. and Mason, J. R. 2007, 'Positive 
Performance and Private Equity Placements: Outside Monitoring or Inside Expertise?' 
Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 389-399.  
 
25 
 
Masulis, R. W. 1983, 'The Impact of Capital Structure Change on Firm Value: Some 
Estimates', Journal of Finance, vol. 38, pp. 107-129.  
 
Masulis, R. W. and Korwar, A. 1986, 'Seasoned Equity Issues: An Empirical 
Investigation', Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 15, pp. 91-118.  
 
Miller, M. H. and Rock, K. 1985, 'Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information', The 
Journal of Finance, vol. 40, no. 1031-1051.  
 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. 1984, 'Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have', Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 187-222.  
 
Newell, G. 2008, Implications for The Strategic Development of UK REITs From The 
Experience of LPTs in Australia, Investment Property Forum (IPF), London.  
 
PIR 2008, Monthly Review - October 2008, PIR, Melbourne.  
 
Ritter, J. 1991, 'The Long Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings', Journal of 
Finance, vol. 46, pp. 3-28.  
 
Sant, R. and Ferris, S. P. 1994, 'Seasoned Equity Offerings: The Case of All-Equity 
Firms', Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 21, pp. 429-444.  
 
Scholes, M. S. 1972, 'Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the 
Effects of Information on Share Prices', Journal of Business, vol. 45, no. April, pp. 179-
211.  
 
Schultz, P. 2003, 'Pseudo Market Timing and the Long-Run Underperformance of IPOs', 
Journal of Finance, vol. 58, pp. 483-517.  
 
Schultz, P. 2004, 'Pseudo Market Timing and the Stationarity of the Event-Generating 
Process', in Working Paper. University of Notre Dame. 
 
26 
 
Seiler, M. J. 2004, Performing Financial Studies: A Methodological Cookbook, Prentice 
Hall, Upper Saddle River. 
 
Walker, M. and Yost, K. 2008, 'Seasoned Equity Offerings: What Firms Say, Do, and 
How the Market Reacts', Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 14, pp. 376-386.  
 
 
